After walking through some crossfire I don't feel in the mood for polished writing up, so in a bid not to lose any more time I'm jotting some more informal notes.
What I need to emphasise is how holism is supposed to work here: of course in asking about the worth of $object one refers to its role in a wider culture, etc. What I want to argue is that the wider culture is the primary value-bearer.
The first point I can make is that a collection of objects can have a greater value than the aggregate value of its components – there's some work ono the breaking up of library collections that nicely reflects this – and so we can readily say that the collection has value. Without wanting to delve very much into mereology, the identification of discrete objects to regard as value-bearers actually looks quite artificial, especially when we can talk about the archæological value of a broken shard of pottery.
All the same, talking about the value of whole fields of human activity looks like a different k. of f., because we're dealing with a different sort of value. That potsherd has archæological value, i.e. it (in concert with other objects) opens up possibilities for archælogical knowledge. We can then ask what the value is of archæological knowledge, and clearly that's a different sort of question. I know what I'm trying to get away from: when the question arises of the defensibility of some copyright-infringing piece of fanfiction, for example, I want to say, don't just ask about the benefits and malefits arising from the existence of this specific piece, look at the role it plays within a fanfic. community. As for whither to go thence...
Well, I'm concerned with the value of something called 'cultural heritage', so probably I associate the archæology of a culture with its heritage, then say archæology has heritage value. There's a certain kind of historical knowledge involved, say, which plays a role for that culture (which could be 'human culture' as well as more localised culture). So now we face the next question, how do we account for the value of enculturation?
I'm fond of quoting the statistic that there are at least 164 definitions of'culture'; I want broad compatibility. Anyway, I can't keep playing with a regress forever; and by now I've started asking, value for whom exactly? If I start appealing to people's pleasures and pains, for example, I've just taken a circuitous route to Utilitarianism. So, in the first place, this is where the (transgenerational) community comes in. Culture and community aren't really separable: the culture is an emergent phenomenon, if you like, of community activity. So one possible line of argument would be that if communities benefit individuals, then preserving cultural heritage and making it publicly available serves that benefit.
Yet... that still feels like a hidden shift away from the value of heritage qua heritage. (I keep returning to the thought that if you don't inwardly understand why libraries are worth preserving, for example, you're soul-dead to begin with. I have some sympathy for Ian Bogost's comments about the possible importance of gaming, too.) Also, maybe it's a mistake to focus on the whole instead of the parts, as though it existed in some transcendent realm.
So I'm returning to my earlier question: what's the upshot of treating high-level agglomerations of activity as primary value-bearers? Well... what do we do when we ask, should $artwork be prevented from leaving the country? We apply the Waverly Criteria, of which the first is the most obviously cultural; all three are concerned with the significance of $artwork. But there are loads of artworks about which we never ask the question: we concern ourselves with individual works which we hold individually significant. Now that may not be mistaken, though what I've noted about collections should give pause for thought, but it does suggest that some sort of prejudgment is going on.
The working principle (also reflected in the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, with its language of 'outstanding universal value') seems to be that there are certain works which are lynchpins of cultural value, and I don't really want to argue with that. But to begin with there have been criticisms by archæologists of the Waverly [Waverley?] Report's containing 'no mention of assemblage, context or provenance, which are all now key concepts in archaeological theory and practice'. Besides the effects on (in this case archæological) value the context of an object can have, there are interrelations between objects, and here inspiration and even the making of what are legalistically termed derivative works comes to mind. I think it's a natural enough thought that a work which has inspired many others thereby accrues, or is thereby revealed to have (on account of its latent potential), increased value thereby, since its existence is a necessary condition for theirs; and so insofar as we value them at all we must value the original work by association. But... what if we took the whole family of works as the value-bearer, perhaps more valuable than the sum of its parts?
It makes some sense: a family of related works, a cluster of related thoughts in the Great Conversation, standing together as a coherent phenomenon. Even where there's no obvious lynchpin work, a whole set of works – historically interesting penny dreadfuls, for example – might make a valuable collection. ('These five fingers. Individually they are nothing, but when I curl them together into a single unit, they form a weapon that is terrible to behold.')
Okay, what might it mean in practical policy terms? Lynchpin works will still be identifiable and recognisably important; but there might also be 'lynchpin collections'. The most notable policy changes would probably be elsewhere; predictably I'm thinking of the public domain. Which is perhaps a suitable stopping point—